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Abstract This paper examines the impact of the recent
financial crisis (2008–2009) on the relation between a
firm’s risk and social performance (SP) using a sample of
non-financial U.S. firms covering the period 1991–2012.
We find that the relation between SP and risk is signifi-
cantly different in the crisis period (post-crisis period)
compared to the pre-crisis period. SP reduces volatility
during the financial crisis. The risk reduction potential of
SP is mainly due to the strengths component of SP. Since
the relation of risk is stronger with SP strengths than SP
concerns, this implies an asymmetric relation between
these SP components and a firm’s risk. Specifically,
strengths act as a risk reduction tool during an adverse
economic environment.
Keywords Financial crisis  Volatility  Idiosyncratic
risk  Social performance  Strengths  Concerns
JEL Classification G32  M14
Introduction
During the last two decades, the concept of corporate social
responsibility (CSR) grew in importance within the finan-
cial community. Several indicators support this claim.
First, there has been an emergence and growth of spe-
cialized investment firms whose role is to monitor the
behavior of firms in social domains and to provide social
ratings for these firms (e.g., MSCI ESG STATS1). Second,
several mutual funds and indices that select firms on the
basis of CSR criteria have emerged (e.g., Dow Jones
Sustainability Indexes, Domini 400 Social Index, Calvert
Social Index). Third, there is an increased interest among
investors in CSR issues. As of 2010, assets engaged in
socially responsible investing (SRI) represent 12.2 % of all
assets under management in the U.S. and 19.1 % in Canada
(SIO 2010; SIF 2010). Also, major institutional investors
from different countries have signed the Principles for
Responsible Investment (PRI) protocol launched in April
2006.2 Finally, most firms, especially larger ones, produce
specific reports or dedicate a specific section of their annual
reports to discuss CSR issues.
This growing importance of CSR has fueled much
research which examines the link between CSR or social
performance (SP) and a firm’s attributes from different
perspectives.3 Unfortunately, the numerous empirical
studies of the relationship between SP and various
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3 The terms CSR and SP are used interchangeably throughout this
paper. The concept of SP can be defined as ‘‘a business organization’s
configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social
responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as
they relate to the firm’s societal relationships’’ (Wood 1991). In
broader terms, CSR refers to the extent of relationships between the
firm and its key stakeholders (employees, customers, suppliers,
community, natural environment, etc.) that go above and beyond what
is legally required (Jo and Harjoto 2012). CSR need not be morally
motivated (i.e., associated with moral duties), because it could be
used strategically to serve the firm’s interests (Jo and Harjoto 2012).
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measures of profitability, cost of capital, shareholder value/
wealth, financial performance (including measures of risk),
and the stock price performance yield mixed and incon-
clusive results (Pava and Krausz 1996; Margolis and Walsh
2003; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Starks 2009; Lee and Faff 2009;
Baron et al. 2011; Oikonomou et al. 2012). This may be
attributable to measurement problems associated with SP
and omitted variables not included in the models used
(Ullmann 1985). This may also be attributable to the dif-
ferences in the conceptualisation of how SP affects a firm’s
attributes. For example, it is still not clear whether and how
SP affects a firm’s risk.4
Generally, previous studies hypothesize that SP will
affect either systematic or idiosyncratic risk.5 Studies
examining the impact of SP on systematic risk (market
beta) argue that idiosyncratic risk is irrelevant since it can
be diversified away through diversification. For example,
Salama et al. (2011) find a negative relationship between a
SP measure combining two dimensions (Community and
Environment) and systematic risk for a sample of U.K.
firms for the 1994–2006 period. Oikonomou et al. (2012)
find a negative (positive) relation between an aggregate
strengths (concerns) measure based on KLD data and
systematic risk for S&P 500 firms (including utilities and
financial firms) for the 1992–2009 period.
Although portfolio theory suggests that only systematic
risk is relevant for asset pricing in perfect markets, a
considerable body of empirical evidence suggests that
idiosyncratic risk is also priced in financial markets (e.g.,
Goyal and Santa-Clara 2003; Ang et al. 2006; Fu 2009).6
Thus, some studies focus on the impact of SP on idiosyn-
cratic risk. For example, Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria
(2004) find a negative relationship between idiosyncratic
risk and an aggregate measure of SP that combines several
SP dimensions for a sample of Canadian firms over the
period 1995–1999. Lee and Faff (2009) find that portfolios
of firms having lower SP (proxied by the inclusion in the
Dow Jones Sustainability Index) outperform portfolios of
firms with superior SP. They conclude that higher returns
for lagging SP firms compensate for the relatively higher
idiosyncratic risk associated with such firms. Goss (2012)
finds that aggregate measures of concerns (strengths) based
on a principal components analysis of KLD data are pos-
itively (negatively) related to idiosyncratic risk measured
using a vector autoregressive model, and that the relation is
stronger for concerns than strengths. This asymmetrical
financial effect is also found in other studies (e.g., Kappou
and Oikonomou 2014; Jiraporn et al. 2014).
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of
the recent financial crisis (2008–2009) on the relation
between a firm’s risk and social performance (SP) using a
sample of non-financial U.S. firms covering the period
1991–2012. In particular, we examine this relationship
during and after the financial crisis. This is highly relevant
for several reasons. First, the financial crisis provides a
natural setting to test main theories advanced in the CSR
literature regarding the link between Risk and SP, e.g., the
risk mitigation view and the overinvestment view. The risk
mitigation view (a risk management argument based on the
stakeholder theory) suggests a negative relationship
between SP and firm risk because higher SP may decrease
the likelihood of negative events at the firm level, and
allow the firm to be better prepared for difficult periods
(e.g., financial crises, economic recessions, compliance
with more stringent future regulations). In contrast, the
overinvestment view (an agency theory argument) suggests
a positive relationship between SP and firm risk because of
managerial entrenchment. During the financial crisis,
almost all firms, including healthier ones, experienced
increased volatility. If the risk mitigation view holds, the
increased volatility of firms with high SP should be lower
relative to firms with low SP during this period. The
reverse should be observed if the overinvestment view
holds.
Second, we argue in this paper that SP influences a
firm’s total risk (stock return volatility) through its impact
on idiosyncratic risk, and that this effect will be stronger
during the financial crisis and potentially in the post-crisis
period. In particular, SP affects idiosyncratic risk through
its impacts on relationship-based intangible assets (e.g.,
trust, brand, reputation, employee moral, and customer
loyalty). The potential cash flows from these intangible
assets depend on the firm’s relationships with its stake-
holders and the related assessments these stakeholders
make regarding the firm’s activities (Godfrey 2005). These
relationship-based intangible assets are expected to be
more valuable during the financial crisis period. The
examination of the post-crisis period allows us to examine
4 Earlier studies use correlation analysis to examine this relationship
(e.g., Spicer 1978; McGuire et al. 1988). Based on a meta-analysis of
18 studies that examine the relationship between SP and firm risk in
any form, Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001) conclude that SP is
negatively correlated with various measures of firm risk, and that
the correlation is stronger for market versus accounting measures.
More recent studies find that SP is negatively related to the cost of
equity capital (Feldman et al. 1997; Sharfman and Fernando 2008; El
Ghoul et al. 2011), and financial distress or default risk (Goss 2007).
5 An exception is Luo and Bhattacharya (2009) who examine both
idiosyncratic and systematic risks in the same study using a sample of
541 large firms in Fortune’s Most Admired Companies over 2 years.
They find that higher SP lowers a firm’s idiosyncratic risk for firms
with higher versus lower advertising, but that a simultaneous pursuit
of SP, advertising, and R&D increases idiosyncratic risk. They also
find a negative relationship between systematic risk (CAPM beta) and
their SP proxy.
6 This might be attributable to violations of the perfect capital market
assumptions in the real world (e.g., costly and risky arbitrage and
impediments to full diversification).
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whether this valuation persists over time or reverts back to
its pre-crisis level.
Our major findings can be summarized as follows. First,
the relation between SP and risk varies over time (is
dynamic) and depends on market conditions. Our results
indicate that the relation between SP and risk is signifi-
cantly different in the crisis period (post-crisis period)
compared to the pre-crisis period. Second, a one standard
deviation increase in the aggregated social performance or
SP (strengths minus concerns) index for a firm reduces its
volatility by about 1.18–1.84 % during the financial crisis.
The risk reduction potential of SP during the financial crisis
is mainly due to the strengths component of SP. A one
standard deviation increase in the aggregate measure of
strengths (Str) decreases a firm’s volatility (idiosyncratic
risk) by about 0.83–2.57 % (0.58–2.43 %) during the
financial crisis. There is also some evidence suggesting that
a one standard deviation increase in the aggregate measure
of concerns (Con) increases total risk by 2.34 % during the
financial crisis. Third, the relation between strengths and
risk is stronger than the relation between concerns and risk
during the financial crisis. This implies an asymmetric
relation between the social performance components and a
firm’s risk with strengths acting as a risk reduction tool
during adverse economic conditions (e.g., financial crises,
economic recessions).
The results of our study contribute to the literature in
several ways. First, our study assesses the risk effects
associated with SP during and after the financial crisis. We
provide a direct test of the risk management hypothesis
where SP can be used strategically by firms to control risk
which is consistent with a large literature showing that
firms hedge to reduce cash flows volatility and the costs of
financial distress (e.g., Stulz 2002). Because of market
imperfections, risk management matters and can be priced
in financial markets (Stulz 2002; Sharfman and Fernando
2008). Second, unlike previous studies, we document an
asymmetric effect of SP on a firm’s risk during and after
the financial crisis where Strengths reduce volatility and
idiosyncratic risk, and Concerns have no or little impact on
risk. Thus, simply avoiding concerns did not help manage
firm risk during the financial crisis. Firms need to have SP
strengths in order to enjoy risk reduction during a crisis
period. Finally, by investigating the impact of SP on a
firm’s risk during and after the recent financial crisis, we
provide strong empirical evidence suggesting that SP (in
particular Strengths) is a risk reduction tool in difficult
periods such as a severe financial or economic crisis. This
fact was a common belief, but had not been tested directly
in the previous empirical CSR literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
‘‘Theoretical Framework and Research Hypotheses’’ sec-
tion formulates the theoretical framework and research
hypotheses. ‘‘Data and Sample Selection’’ section
describes the data and sample selection procedure.
‘‘Methodology’’ section describes the methodology used to
test our hypotheses. ‘‘Empirical Results’’ and ‘‘Robustness
Checks’’ sections present and analyze our empirical results.
‘‘Conclusion’’ section concludes.
Theoretical Framework and Research Hypotheses
Effect of Social Performance on Risk
The CSR literature suggests three theoretical arguments
that could explain how SP influences a firm’s risk: the risk
mitigation view, theoretical models relating SP to expected
returns, and the overinvestment view. The first two argu-
ments predict a negative relation between SP and risk,
while the overinvestment argument predicts a positive
relationship.
The risk mitigation view (a risk management argument
based on the stakeholder theory) predicts that SP is nega-
tively related to firm risk. More specifically, this argument
suggests that CSR investments (i.e., higher SP) can gen-
erate moral capital or goodwill among stakeholders, which
provide insurance-like protection that reduces a firm’s risk
exposure, i.e., preserves rather than generates financial
performance (Godfrey 2005; Godfrey et al. 2009).7 This
moral capital creates relational wealth in different forms
among different stakeholder groups, e.g., affective com-
mitment among employees, legitimacy among communi-
ties and regulators, trust among suppliers and partners,
credibility and enhanced brand among customers, and
higher attractiveness for investors (Godfrey 2005). The key
point is that this moral capital has value as it disposes
stakeholders to hold beliefs about the firm which influence
their behaviors towards the firm (Luo and Bhattacharya
2009). Thus, ‘‘CSR based moral capital creates value if it
helps stakeholders attribute the negative event to man-
agerial maladroitness rather than malevolence, and temper
their reactions accordingly’’ (Godfrey et al. 2009, p. 428).
Firms with higher SP will have higher moral capital
which translates into a more favorable evaluation of the
firm in the eyes of various stakeholder groups (e.g., con-
sumers, employees and investors). In particular, higher
moral capital provides insurance-like protection for the
firm’s shareholder wealth by creating goodwill and miti-
gating negative stakeholders’ assessments when they are
adversely affected in the event of a crisis. For example, a
firm’s relationships with its key stakeholders will be
7 CSR activities will generate positive moral capital when both the
acts themselves and the imputations about the firm receive positive
evaluations from stakeholders (Godfrey 2005).
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tempered by the higher moral capital accumulated (e.g.,
customers’ loyalty and investors’ trust will suffer to a
lesser extent). In other words, stakeholders will impose less
severe sanctions on the firm with higher moral capital in
the case of negative events. Also, higher SP helps to
decouple the negative shocks (events) from the rest of the
organization (Bansal and Clelland 2004), protect its public
image, relieve regulatory pressure, and insulate the firm
from scrutiny (Luo and Bhattacharya 2009). Consistent
with this argument, Godfrey et al. (2009) find, using an
event study methodology, that a SP measure combining the
strengths of two dimensions (community and diversity) is
positively related to the two-day cumulative abnormal
returns following negative legal/regulatory actions against
firms.
Furthermore, higher (lower) SP may reduce (increase)
financial and operating risks (McGuire et al. 1988), and/or
risk associated with social issues (Feldman et al. 1997;
Sharfman and Fernando 2008; El Ghoul et al. 2011).
Sharfman and Fernando (2008) argue that risk management
of social or environmental issues is theoretically synony-
mous with strategic risk management. For instance, CSR
investments (e.g., emissions and pollution reduction)
reduce a firm’s risk from known and unknown hazards, and
consequently reduce the number of potential claimants on a
firm’s cash flows (e.g., potential fines, compensation, set-
tlements, compliance costs, clean-up costs in the case of
environmental accidents, or problems associated with poor
working conditions). Firms with lower social performance
may face several risks (e.g., damage to brand image and
reputation, lower favorable investor recognition).
The risk mitigation view suggests that higher SP through
CSR investments generates moral capital which creates
relational wealth in different forms among different
stakeholders (i.e., market-based intangible assets). This
relational wealth reduces uncertainty about a firm’s future
cash flows and, therefore reduces a firm’s risk. This is
achieved through the insurance-like protection for a firm’s
idiosyncratic intangible assets provided by CSR
investments.
Theoretical models of the relationship between SP and
expected returns (e.g., Heinkel et al. 2001; Mackey et al.
2007; Fama and French 2007) also suggest that SP is
negatively related to firm risk. These models assume dif-
ferences in investor preferences that can lead to segmented
capital market pricing based on SP. Specifically, traditional
investors make investment decisions based solely on
financial criteria (anticipated payoffs and the access to
overall consumption they provide) while socially respon-
sible investors make investment decisions based on both
financial and non-financial criteria (e.g., SP). Unlike tra-
ditional investors, socially responsible investors get addi-
tional utility from holding stocks chosen based on their SP
because they have tastes for such assets as consumption
goods that are unrelated to returns (Fama and French
2007). The main prediction of these models is the existence
of price differences induced by demand differences for
different types of stocks. Socially responsible stocks will
have an excess demand which leads to lower risk and
expected return (overvalued stocks). In contrast, socially
irresponsible stocks (i.e., stocks having lower SP) will have
a weak demand due to the ‘‘neglect effect,’’ which leads to
higher risk and expected returns to compensate for lower
risk sharing opportunities (undervalued stocks).
The main prediction derived from the theoretical models
of the relationship between SP and expected returns is
similar to that derived from the equilibrium model with
incomplete information developed by Merton (1987) and
imperfect markets due to market or regulatory frictions
developed by Mao (1971), Levy (1978), and Kryzanowski
and To (1982) where different investors hold different
portfolios of risky assets in equilibrium. This leads to a
differential ‘‘neglect effect’’ for stocks and segmented
markets (or price differences induced by demand differ-
ences for different types of stocks).8 In particular, the
model of Merton (1987) predicts that a firm’s risk is neg-
atively related to the size of that firm’s investor base (i.e.,
the number of its shareholders). In turn, this suggests a
negative relationship between SP and firm risk since a
higher SP is expected to increase the investor base. Lee and
Faff (2009) argue that the model of Merton (1987) is
consistent with the argument that the risk management and
transparency practices associated with SP are valued by
investors.
In contrast to the aforementioned arguments, the over-
investment view (a managerial opportunism argument
based on agency theory) suggests a positive relationship
between SP and firm risk because of managerial
entrenchment. For example, managers may choose to
improve their firm’s SP score at the expense of share-
holders by over-investing in CSR activities in order to
build their own personal reputations as good social citizens
(Barnea and Rubin 2010) or to generate support from social
and environmental activists in order to reduce the proba-
bility of their replacement in a future period (Cespa and
Cestone 2007). Surroca and Tribo´ (2008) provide empirical
evidence suggesting that a firm’s SP may form part of a
manager’s entrenchment strategy. They also find that the
8 Consistent with the ‘‘neglect effect’’ caused by SP, Hong and
Kacperczyk (2009) find that sin stocks (tobacco, alcohol and gaming)
are neglected by institutional investors subject to social norms such as
pension funds. Sin stocks are held less by social norm-constrained
institutions, receive less coverage from analysts, and have higher
expected returns (i.e., higher amounts of priced risk) than otherwise
comparable stocks.
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combination of entrenchment strategies and higher SP have
negative effects on financial performance.
Effect of Social Performance on Risk During
and After the Financial Crisis
CSR expenditures can be expected to be lower given
poorer economic conditions or when firms are more
financially constrained. Ullman (1985) argues that eco-
nomic demands will have priority over social demands in
periods of low profitability. Branca et al. (2012) show
theoretically and empirically that firms invest less in CSR
activities (e.g., donate less) when the business cycle is
unfavorable (e.g., the recent financial crisis), independently
of the market structure. It seems reasonable to expect the
current state of the economy (macroeconomic context or
conditions) to have an effect on the financial performance
of firms as well as on their SP. Under adverse macroeco-
nomic conditions (e.g., negative shocks to demand), firms
must decide whether to restrict their CSR expenditures in
order to save resources, or use CSR to differentiate them-
selves more effectively (Branca et al. 2012). This is a
legitimate argument. However, in this paper we look at this
problem from a different perspective. Instead of asking the
question of whether firms tend to reduce, maintain, or
increase CSR expenditures because of adverse macroeco-
nomic conditions, we ask the following question: can SP be
a risk reduction tool in periods of adverse macroeconomic
conditions?
Examining the relation between a firm’s risk and its SP
during and after the financial crisis is relevant for two main
reasons. First, the financial crisis provides a natural setting
to test the main theories advanced in the CSR literature
regarding the link between Risk and SP, e.g., the risk
mitigation view and the overinvestment view. During the
financial crisis, almost all firms experienced increased
volatility. If the risk mitigation view holds, the increased
volatility of firms with high SP should be lower relative to
firms with lower SP. The reverse should be observed if the
overinvestment view holds. Second, we argue in this paper
that SP influences a firm’s total risk (stock return volatility)
through its impact on idiosyncratic risk,9 and that this
effect will be stronger during the financial crisis and
potentially in the post-crisis period. In particular, SP affects
idiosyncratic risk through its impacts on relationship-based
intangible assets (e.g., trust, brand, reputation, employee
moral, and customer loyalty). The potential cash flows
from these intangible assets depend on the firm’s rela-
tionships with its stakeholders and the related assessments
these stakeholders make regarding the firm’s activities
(Godfrey 2005). Those relationship-based assets (i.e.,
relational wealth) are intangible and idiosyncratic to the
firm (Godfrey 2005). In other words, relational wealth is
heterogeneous between firms and idiosyncratic to specific
firm-stakeholder relationships. These relationship-based
intangible assets are expected to be more valuable during
the financial crisis period. The examination of the post-
crisis period allows us to examine whether this valuation
persists over time or reverts back to its pre-crisis level.
It is well known that there are points in time (e.g., credit
crises, economic recessions) when investors perceive firms
to be more risky than during other times. Regardless of the
economic prospects for firms, the markets suddenly
become ‘‘more risky’’ leading to lower stock prices (i.e.,
lower firm values). During periods of economic recession,
the average volatility increases, but the volatility increase
of more risky firms (e.g., those with lower SP) could be
dramatic. In a flight to safety during economic recessions
or slowdowns, many investors seek the haven of less risky
securities (e.g., U.S. Treasury bonds). More socially
responsible firms (those with higher SP) could also be
considered as less risky, and thus more safe relative to
similar firms with lower SP. Investors may consider firms
with higher (lower) SP as being less (more) risky invest-
ments because they may link SP with a higher quality of
management (McGuire et al. 1988; Waddock and Graves
1997). Lee and Faff (2009) argue that firms with higher SP
are able to reduce their idiosyncratic (business) risk relative
to firms with lower SP. Based on the risk mitigation view
as well as theoretical models relating SP to expected
returns, we develop the following hypothesis stated in its
alternative form:
H1
A SP is negatively related to firm risk, in particular
idiosyncratic risk, during the financial crisis.
SP is an aggregate measure of the social performance of
a firm at a given point in time. More specifically, it rep-
resents the difference between strengths (positive CSR) and
concerns (negative CSR). It is important to distinguish
explicitly between the strengths and concerns because they
are conceptually distinct constructs (Mattingly and Berman
2006). They are likely to have different effects on firm risk
since these two SP components are not strongly correlated
(0.24 in our data). Furthermore, the possibility of substi-
tution or compensation effects (e.g., Greenwashing) exists.
Firms may undertake CSR investments to increase their
strengths in order to compensate for current or future
concerns.
The hypothesized negative relation between SP and risk
could come either from strengths, concerns or both. For
9 This is consistent with the framework of Bouslah et al. (2013) who
argue that SP affects the firm’s total risk through its impact on
idiosyncratic risk because the implications of SP actions and practices
are idiosyncratic to the firm. This is also in line with the literature
relating firm idiosyncratic risk to corporate governance (e.g., Ferreira
and Laux 2007).
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example, Mishra and Modi (2013) find that the idiosyn-
cratic risk is negatively related to strengths, and positively
related to concerns. In this case, the negative relation
between SP and risk comes from both strengths and con-
cerns. However, Oikonomou et al. (2012) find that sys-
tematic risk is positively and strongly related to concerns.
In this case, the negative relation between SP and risk
comes mainly from concerns. Lankoski (2009) argues that
the economic impacts of SP are more positive for issues
that reduce negative externalities (e.g., reducing or avoid-
ing concerns) than for issues that generate positive exter-
nalities (e.g., having or increasing strengths). Several
previous studies document the economic impact of con-
cerns (e.g., Frooman 1997; Godfrey et al. 2009; Oikono-
mou et al. 2012; Goss and Roberts 2011; Goss 2012).
Concerns are expected to have a positive impact on a firm’s
risk because they are more likely to affect both traditional
and socially responsible investors. It is reasonable to expect
both types of investors to punish firms for concerns, i.e.,
socially irresponsible behavior such as product recalls, oil
spills, sweatshop operations, or employee hazards in the
workplace. It is also reasonable to expect such a market
penalty to happen during normal market conditions as well
as in period of economic crisis or recession. The penalty
could even be higher in the latter case.
In this paper, we extend this literature by examining the
less studied case where the negative relation between SP
and risk comes mainly from strengths. In particular, we
argue that SP reduces volatility and idiosyncratic risk
during the financial crisis, and that the risk reduction
potential of SP is mainly due to the strengths component of
SP. Although investors may not agree on the value of the
strengths and on their impacts (Ioannou and Serafeim
2014; Edmans, 2011), we hypothesize that this could not be
the case during the financial crisis. For example, the risk
mitigation view suggests that firms with higher SP (i.e.,
those having strengths) will develop goodwill or moral
capital that functions as ‘‘insurance-like’’ protection during
bad times. In other words, strengths could be very useful
during adverse macroeconomic conditions where investors
seek less risky securities (a flight to safety).10 We believe
that in adverse macroeconomic conditions, the role of non-
financial attributes such as SP becomes very important. In
this case, SP will play the role of a simple scale that
enables investors to readily assess a firm’s risk similar to
credit ratings which provide information about default
likelihood and the financial health of firms. Jiraporn et al.
(2014) find that more socially responsible firms enjoy more
favorable credit ratings. That is, firms with higher strengths
will be perceived as being less risky firms. This is highly
valued by investors during adverse macroeconomic con-
ditions. In short, SP (in particular Strengths) could be a risk
reduction tool in difficult periods such as a severe financial
or economic crisis. Therefore, we expect an asymmetric
effect where the relation with firm risk is stronger for the
strengths measure than for the concerns measure during a
crisis. This leads to our second hypothesis stated in its
alternative form:
H2
A There is an asymmetric effect where the relation with
firm risk is stronger for the strengths measure than for the
concerns measure of SP during the financial crisis.
Data and Sample Selection
The social performance data for U.S. firms from the MSCI
ESG STATS (formerly KLD Research & Analytics, Inc or
KLD) database have been used extensively by other
researchers (e.g., Mattingly and Berman 2006; Kempf and
Osthoff 2008; Gregory and Whittaker 2013). Based on
calendar year-end data, the database provides Strength
ratings and Concern ratings for several binary indicators
(i.e., 1 or zero value for presence or absence) for seven
qualitative dimensions and only Concern ratings for sev-
eral indicators of six exclusionary dimensions. It also
provides total counts of all strengths and concerns in each
of these 13 dimensions. The seven qualitative dimensions
are Community, Diversity, Employee Relations, Environ-
ment, Product, Human Rights (formerly ‘‘non-US opera-
tions’’ before 2002), and Corporate Governance (formerly
‘‘Other’’ category before 2002). The six exclusionary
dimensions are Alcohol, Gambling, Firearms, Military,
Nuclear Power, and Tobacco. Since the exclusionary
dimensions are fundamentally different from the qualita-
tive dimensions, we follow previous research (see e.g.,
Harjoto and Jo 2008; Jiraporn et al. 2014) and do not
include them in our analysis. The KLD rating (either
strength or concern) for a particular indicator within a
particular qualitative dimension is a binary variable which
is equal to one if the firm has a strength or concern, and
zero otherwise (i.e., has no strength or concern). For
example, a firm that implements pollution prevention and
recycling programs will have a positive score along the
environmental dimension. Conversely, a firm that has poor
union relations and retirement benefits concerns will have a
negative score along the employee relations dimension.11
KLD data are free of survivorship bias (Kempf and Osthoff
2008) and does not change much from year to year
10 For example, the GARCH model of Glosten et al. (1993) allows
for an asymmetric effect on volatility of good and bad news.
11 It is important to note that KLD implemented several changes in
its database during the sample period. For example, KLD added the
Climate Change Concern in 1999 and the Management Systems
strength in 2006 under the Environment dimension.
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(Gregory and Whittaker 2013). KLD data are the most
recognized and accepted in the literature (Jiraporn et al.
2014).
Our final sample consists of an unbalanced panel dataset
of 28,110 firm-year observations for all non-financial and
non-utility firms covered by MSCI ESG STATS or KLD
and three other databases (CRSP, COMPUSTAT and I/B/
E/S) over the period 1991–2012 based on each firm’s
CUSIP. For many firms, we perform a hand-check to
ensure a successful merging process. We obtain stock
prices, stock returns, trading volumes, and shares out-
standings from CRSP. Accounting data are obtained from
COMPUSTAT. Analyst earnings forecasts data are
obtained from Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S.
Methodology
Measuring Social Performance
Most empirical studies using KLD data combine the vari-
ous SP dimensions into one aggregate SP measure using
different methods (e.g., Graves and Waddock 1994; Wad-
dock and Graves 1997; Harjoto and Jo 2008; Jiraporn et al.
2014). For example, Harjoto and Jo (2008) net the average
concerns and strengths for each of the five KLD dimen-
sions considered, and then compute an arithmetic average
index of SP. In this paper, we follow Harjoto and Jo (2008)
and use strengths Strit, concerns Conit and their aggregation
SPit ¼ Strit  Conit, where the former two are respectively
given by12:
Strit ¼ 1
D
XD
d¼1
1
NSTR
XL
l¼1
Strengthl
" #
it
ð1Þ
Conit ¼ 1
D
XD
d¼1
1
NCON
XJ
j¼1
concernj
" #
it
ð2Þ
where d refers to the KLD dimension, and D is the total
number of KLD dimensions for a given year t and firm
i. NSTR and NCON are total maximum possible numbers of
strengths and concerns, respectively, for a given KLD
dimension for a given year.13
Measuring Firm Risk
We measure a firm’s total risk by the annualized standard
deviation from the daily stock returns over the past year.
We compute systematic risk (market beta) and idiosyn-
cratic (unsystematic) risk using the basic CAPM and the
four-factor Carhart (1997) model, respectively, using the
factors obtained from Kenneth French’s web site.14 The
latter model is given by:
Rit  Rft ¼ ai þ biMðRMt  RftÞ þ bisSMBt þ bihHMLt
þ biuUMDt þ eit
ð3Þ
where
Rit is the return of firm i for day t. Rft is the risk-free rate
(daily Treasury-bill rate). ðRMt  RftÞ is the excess return
on the market portfolio (CSRP value-weighted index) for
day t. SMBt is the difference between the returns on
portfolios of ‘‘small’’ and ‘‘big’’ capitalization stocks for
day t. HMLt is the difference between the returns on
portfolios of ‘‘high’’ and ‘‘low’’ book-to-market stocks for
day t. UMDt is the difference between the daily returns on
portfolios of ‘‘high’’ and ‘‘low’’ prior return (months -12
to -2) stocks. eit is the stochastic error term, assumed to be
IID normal with mean zero and constant variance or
idiosyncratic risk r2ei .
15 The CAPM model is obtained by
dropping the last three factors. All models are estimated
using factor returns. Systematic risk (market beta) and
unsystematic (idiosyncratic) risk are estimated for both
models using the previous year’s daily excess returns for
each firm-year observation. Idiosyncratic (unsystematic)
risk is measured as the annualized standard deviation of the
residuals from these estimations. This follows common
practice in the literature where risk is measured using
higher frequency (daily) data over shorter time periods of
up to 1 year to better capture its time-varying nature.16
12 We also consider other measures of social performance (e.g., the
sum of the differences between ‘‘total strengths’’ and ‘‘total concerns’’
of each KLD dimension for a given year, divided by the total number
of KLD dimensions for that year). All these measures are highly
positively correlated with the measures considered here and provide
virtually the same results.
13 A similar approach is used by Deng et al. (2013) who find that
aggregate social performance (‘‘strengths’’ minus ‘‘concerns’’) has a
significant positive effects on merger performance and the probability
of its completion.
14 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_
library.html.
15 Several studies use the market model to compute idiosyncratic risk
(e.g., Malkiel and Xu 1997; Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria 2004; Lee
and Faff 2009).
16 In addition to the above traditional risk measures which consider
both upside potential and downside risk, we also compute lower
partial moments (LPMs) as downside risk measures. LPMs consider
only negative deviations of returns from a minimal acceptable return,
e.g., zero, the risk-free rate or the average return (Homaifar and
Graddy 1990; Sortino and Forsey 1996). Assuming that the target
return is zero, the lower partial moment of order n for firm i is given
by: LPMi nð Þ ¼ 1T
PT
t¼1
max Ritð Þ; 0½ n where Rit is the daily return of
firm i at day t. LPM of order 0 (LPM0) can be interpreted as the
shortfall probability (i.e., probability of loss when the target return is
zero), whereas LPM of order 1 (LPM1) can be interpreted as the
expected shortfall (or loss when the target return is zero). LPM of
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Relation Between Firm Risk and Social
Performance
Our objective is to examine the impact of the recent
financial crisis on the link between social performance and
a firm’s risk. To do so, we estimate the following
regressions:
Riskit ¼ a0 þ a1SPit þ a2SPit  Crisisit þ a3SPit
 Postcrisisit þ dXit þ eit ð4Þ
Riskit ¼ a0 þ a11Strit þ a12Strit  Crisisit þ a13Strit
 PostCrisisit þ a21Conit þ a22Conit  Crisisit
þ a23Conit  PostCrisisit þ dXit þ eit
ð5Þ
where Riskit and SPit are the risk and the social perfor-
mance measure for firm i at time t, respectively. Xit is a
vector of firm-specific characteristics, industry factors, and
economic or market-wide factors that affect a firm’s risk. d
is a vector of the related regression coefficients.
The ‘‘pre-crisis’’ period is 1991–2007, the ‘‘crisis’’
period is 2008–2009, and the ‘‘post-crisis’’ period is
2010–2012. As such, the variable ‘‘Crisis’’ (‘‘PostCrisis’’)
is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for years 2008
and 2009 (years 2010, 2011, and 2012) and zero for the
other years in the sample period.17 The interactions
variables SPit  Crisisit and SPit  PostCrisisit are our
main variables of interest. Using Eq. (4) to illustrate, the
coefficient a1 gives the estimated effect of SP on the
measure of risk for the pre-crisis period and the base value
for the crisis and post-crisis periods. The coefficient a2
gives the additional effect of SP on the measure of risk for
the crisis period, whereas the coefficient a3 gives the
additional effect of SP on the measure of risk for the post-
crisis period. If a2 is significant, it indicates that the rela-
tionship between risk and SP is different between the two
periods (pre-crisis and crisis periods). If a3 is significant, it
indicates that the relationship between risk and SP is dif-
ferent between the two periods (pre-crisis and post-crisis
periods). The total effect of SP on the measure of risk for
the crisis period is given by the sum ða1 þ a2Þ, whereas the
total effect of SP on the measure of risk for the post-crisis
period is given by the sum ða1 þ a3Þ. Thus, a1 informs us
about the sign and significance of the relation between risk
and SP in the pre-crisis period, whereas ða1 þ a2Þ and
ða1 þ a3Þ inform us about the sign and significance of this
relation in the crisis and post-crisis periods, respectively.
Similarly, in Eq. (5), the coefficient a12 represents the
additional impact of Strengths on risk during the financial
crisis relative to the pre-crisis period, whereas a13 does the
same for the post-crisis period. The coefficients a22 and a23
represent the additional impact of Concerns on risk during
the financial crisis and the post-crisis period relative to the
pre-crisis period.
Table 1 lists the determinants of firm risk used herein.
Firm-specific characteristics (expected sign) include
Firm size (-),18 Book-to-Market (B/M) ratio (?),19
Financial leverage (?),20 Expected return (?),21
Footnote 16 continued
order 2 (LPM2) is the semi-variance around the target return. The
higher the LPM order, the more risk averse the investor is (Sortino
and Forsey 1996). We compute LPMs yearly for each firm-year
observation using the previous year’s daily returns. The untabulated
results for LPM1 through LPM3 are similar to those reported for total
and idiosyncratic risks and are available from the authors upon
request. It appears that the return distributions are reasonably sym-
metric so that all the correlations between total risk and LPM1
through LPM3 are 0.88 or higher. The mean (median) skewness of the
daily returns is 1.29 (0.59) over the sample period (1991–2012). The
mean (median) skewness of the daily returns is 0.64 (0.56) if we
exclude the crisis period (2008 and 2009).
In order to further examine the robustness of the main findings, we
also calculated downside beta and LPM2 of the residuals using the
four-factor model estimated with daily returns. The mean (median)
downside systematic risk (downside market beta) is 1.165 (1.1). The
mean (median) LPM2 of the residuals is 0.254 (0.225). LPM2 of the
residuals is very highly correlated to total risk (0.92) and idiosyncratic
risk (0.96). Similarly, the correlation coefficient between downside
market beta and the market beta is high (0.77). The results for LPM2
of the residuals and downside systematic risk (downside market beta)
are virtually similar to those reported in this paper. These untabulated
results are available from the authors upon request.
17 The global financial crisis is commonly referred to in the literature
as the ‘‘2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis.’’ Ait-Sahalia et al. (2012)
use a Markov-Switching vector autoregression analysis of bond
market data to identify the onset and end of the GFC (Global
Financial Crisis) period as June 2007 and April 2009, respectively.
Several papers select 2008 and 2009 as the years of the financial crisis
including Murillo et al. (2011), Peters et al. (2012) and Lins et al.
(2013).
18 Fama and French (1992, 1993); Berk et al. (1999); Carlson et al.
(2004, 2006); Gebhardt et al. (2001); Botosan and Plumlee (2005);
Gode and Mohanram (2003); Hail and Leuz (2006); Lee et al. (2009).
19 Gode and Mohanram (2003) argue that high B/M could reflect
lower growth opportunities, lower accounting conservatism, or higher
perceived risk.
20 Botosan and Plumlee (2005), Witmer and Zorn (2007) and Lee
et al. (2009).
21 The firm’s expected return is expected to be positively related to
stock return volatility and the firm’s beta (Gordon and Gordon 1997;
Gode and Mohanram 2003; Botosan and Plumlee 2005; Hail and
Leuz 2006; Lee et al. 2009) and to its idiosyncratic risk (Malkiel and
Xu 1997; Lee and Faff 2009). However, the empirical evidence
regarding the relation between market beta and expected return
(proxied by the implied cost of equity) is mixed. For example, Gordon
and Gordon (1997) and Gode and Mohanram (2003) find a positive
relation, whereas Gebhardt et al. (2001) find no significant relation
after controlling for the previous year’s average industry risk
premium.
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Stock liquidity (-),22 Cash flow risk (?), Investment-to- asset ratio (-),23 Expected growth in earnings (?),
Table 1 Definition of the variables
Variable Measure
Aggregate social
performance (SP)
Aggregate (composite) measure of social performance, which combines strengths and concerns (SP = Str-Con)
Strengths (Str) Aggregate measure of strengths
Concerns (Con) Aggregate measure of concerns
Systematic risk
(betadcapmw)
The market beta derived from the CAPM using the previous year’s daily excess returns for each firm-year
observation
Systematic risk (betad4ffw) The market beta derived from the four-factor Carhart (1997) model using the previous year’s daily excess returns
for each firm-year observation
Idiosyncratic risk
(IVcapmdw)
The annualized standard deviation of the residuals derived from the CAPM model estimated using the previous
year’s daily excess returns
Idiosyncratic risk (IV4ffdw) The annualized standard deviation of the residuals derived from the four-factor Carhart (1997) model estimated
using the previous year’s daily excess returns
Firm’s total risk (voldw) The annualized standard deviation from the daily stock returns over the past year
Firm size (lnmkteq) The natural logarithm of the market value of common equity at the most recent fiscal year end to account for
the highly skewed nature of this variable
Book-to-Market (B/M) ratio
(bmw)
The ratio of the book-to-market value of common equity as of the most recent fiscal year end
Financial leverage (netlevw) We follow Bates et al. (2009) by using a net leverage measure calculated as the ratio of long-term debt minus
cash & marketable securities to the market value of common equity using values for the most recent fiscal
year end
Expected return (rmedinfw) The expected return is proxied by the implied cost of equity capital (rmedinfw) calculated using the implied
cost of capital (ICC) methodology (see the Appendix). We also consider the annualized return from the
previous year’s daily stock returns (ret1y). The ICC is a much less noisier measure of expected returns than
realized returns. Therefore, we use rmedinfw in our regressions as proxy for expected returns
Stock liquidity (both level and
risk)
The level of liquidity (avgturnover) is proxied by the average daily share turnover (daily shares traded divided
by daily shares outstanding), and the liquidity risk is proxied by the coefficient of variation (cvturnover) of
this measure over the previous year. The Amihud illiquidity measure (illiq) is computed as in Amihud (2002)
Cash flow risk Dispersion of analyst forecasts: the cross-sectional standard deviation of either one-year-ahead earnings
forecasts (dispeps1w) or long-term growth in earnings forecasts (displtg). We expect a positive relation
between the dispersion of analyst forecasts and firm risk because a higher dispersion in earnings forecasts
implies greater disagreement between analysts about forecasted earnings
Standard deviation of the return on assets (ROA): the standard deviation of ROA (sdroa5yw) is computed over
the five previous years up to the fiscal year end date of each firm-year observation
Investment-to-asset ratio
(Investmentw)
We use three proxies for investment: capital expenditures divided by total assets (capex), R&D expenditures
divided by total assets (rd), and advertising expenses divided by total assets (ad). Investment-to-asset ratio is
the sum of these three variables divided by total assets
Expected growth in earnings
(expgrthw)
The mean annualized five-year earnings growth rate from I/B/E/S (where available, otherwise estimated as the
implicit growth in forecasted earnings from year 1 to year 2)
Default risk Altman’s (1993) Zscore:
Zscore ¼ 1:2 NWCTA
 
þ 1:4 RE
TA
 
þ 3:3 EBIT
TA
 
þ Sales
TA
 
þ0:6 MVEquityBVTL
 
where NWC is net working capital (current assets—current liabilities), RE is retained earnings, EBIT is
earnings before interest and taxes, MVEquity is the market value of total equity (common and preferred
stocks), BVTL is total liabilities (current and long-term liabilities), and TA is total assets. A higher value of
the Zscore indicates a lower likelihood of default
Size of investor base
(inv_basew)
The number of common ordinary shareholders divided by common shares outstanding
22 Brennan et al. (1998) find a negative relation between average
returns and average dollar trading volume. Chordia et al. (2001) find a
negative cross-sectional relation between average returns and both the
level as well as the variability of liquidity, after controlling for size,
book-to-market ratio, and momentum.
23 The q-theory of investment (e.g., Cochrane 1991; Liu et al. 2007)
and the real options theory (e.g., Berk et al. 1999; Carlson et al. 2004,
2006) predict a negative relation between investment and risk. It
follows that firms having higher investment-to-assets ratios should
have lower risks than firms having lower investment-to-assets ratios.
Social Performance and Firm Risk: Impact of the Financial Crisis
123
Default risk (?), and the size of the investor base (-).24
We estimate Eqs. 4 and 5 using three estimation meth-
ods: two-way cluster regression model, two-way fixed
effects panel data regression model, and instrumental
variables (IV) regression model. Any robust effect should
hold regardless of the methodology used. The two-way
cluster model is the robust approach of Petersen (2009)
which clusters standard errors on both firm and time
effects. We include industry dummy variables, based on
the Fama and French (1997) industry classification, to
control for industry fixed effects. We also include year
dummy variables to control for the effects of changing
economic conditions on a firm’s risk. For the two-way
fixed effects panel data regression model, we control for
firm fixed effects as well as time effects. The fixed effects
approach mitigates the omitted variable bias by controlling
for unobservable firm characteristics that remain constant
through time. We do not include industry dummies in the
fixed effects model as those effects are already subsumed
in the firm fixed effects.
Correcting for the Endogeneity of Social Performance25
The regression specification in Eqs. (4 or 5) assumes that
social performance SP is exogenous. However, SP may be
endogenous because some of the regressors (e.g., firm size
and industry) and unobserved variables that are omitted in
the model could affect both SP and the firm’s risk. In such
cases, the explanatory variable SPit is likely to be
endogenous. This endogeneity problem could produce a
spurious relationship.
To correct for this potential endogeneity problem, we
use the instrumental variables (IV) regression method
estimated using the two-step efficient generalized method
of moments (GMM)26:
SPit ¼ cþ gZit þ hYit þ xit ð6Þ
Riskit ¼ a0 þ a1SPit þ a2SPit  Crisisit þ a3SPit
 PostCrisisit þ dXit þ eit ð7Þ
where Zit denotes instruments, and Yit denotes variables
that affect social performance (e.g., firm size and industry).
Chosen instruments should be correlated with SP but have
zero or low correlation with the disturbance in the
structural model for the firm’s risk (Eq. 7). We follow
Jiraporn et al. (2014) and use the average SP of neigh-
boring firms (geographically proximate firms) as well as
the average industry SP as instruments. Jiraporn et al.
(2014) show that SP is significantly influenced by the SP of
the surrounding firms in the same three-digit zip code, an
effect possibly due to investor clientele, local competition,
and/or social interactions. The variation in SP across zip
codes is likely exogenous because it is not correlated with
corporate financial policies or outcomes. The U.S. Postal
Service allocates zip codes exclusively based on efficiency
in postal delivery, not corporate financial policies or out-
comes (Jiraporn et al. 2014).
We also use the average industry SP as an instrument.
Firm risk may be related to firm-level SP, but it is less
likely related to industry level SP. Thus, the changes in SP
at the industry level are more likely to be exogenous.
Moreover, the use of the average industry SP allow us to
control for industry differences in the SP scores because
social issues are different for different industries and are
time-varying (Carroll 1999). Each industry has different
configurations of stakeholders with disparate degrees of
activism on the issues (Carroll 1999). To construct the two
instruments, we follow the same methodology as Jiraporn
et al. (2014). We conduct a statistical test (Hansen J
statistic) of overidentifying restrictions to ensure the
validity of the used instruments. If the Hansen J statistic
(overidentification test of all instruments) is not statistically
significant (i.e., p value higher or equal to 0.1), our
instrumental variables are valid. In the first stage regres-
sion, we use our instruments in order to predict SPit, Strit,
or Conit. In the second stage regression, we use the fitted
values (SPit, Str

it, or Con

it) obtained in the first stage
[Eq. (6)] as the explanatory variables instead of their
original values, and run the regression in Eq. (7). We
include industry and year dummy variables in both stages
and we only report the results of the second stage
estimation.
Cross-Sectional Determinants of SP
In Eq. (6), Yit is a vector of firm-specific characteristics,
industry factors, and market-wide factors that could affect
SP. h is the related vector of coefficients. Previous
empirical studies find that SP can be affected by several
firm characteristics which include risk (e.g., beta and
standard deviation of returns), firm size, leverage ratio,
book-to-market ratio, capital expenditures, R&D expendi-
tures, advertising expenses, and industry.27 Moreover,
24 Firm risk is expected to be negatively related to the size of its
investor base (Merton 1987).
25 There are three potential sources of endogeneity: simultaneity bias;
omitted variables bias; self-selection bias. Depending on the research
question, one of two procedures is used to correct for endogeneity:
Heckman two-step procedure for self-selection bias or Instrumental
variable (IV) estimation.
26 The GMM estimation generates efficient estimates of the coeffi-
cients and consistent estimates of the standard errors that are robust to
the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm.
27 See Graves and Waddock (1994), Waddock and Graves (1997),
McWilliams and Siegel (2000), Hillman and Keim (2001), Orlitzky
and Benjamin (2001), Margolis and Walsh (2003), Orlitzky et al.
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recent studies find that SP is negatively related to the cost
of equity capital (Feldman et al. 1997; Sharfman and
Fernando 2008; El Ghoul et al. 2011), and financial distress
or default risk (Goss, 2007).
Based on theoretical arguments and the empirical evi-
dence reported in these previous studies, the firm-specific
characteristics considered in the SP model used herein are
firm size (lnmkteq), Book-to-Market ratio (bmw), net
leverage (netlevw), the cost of equity capital (ICC), the
level of stock liquidity (avgturnover), the liquidity risk
(cvturnover), dispersion of analyst forecasts (dispeps1w),
investment-to-asset ratio (investment), expected growth in
earnings (expgrthw), default risk (zscorew), and investor
base (inv_basew).28
The variable investor base (inv_basew) is included to
control for ownership structure following the empirical
evidence reported in previous studies showing a significant
relationship between SP and some measures of ownership
structure such as institutional and insiders’ ownership (e.g.,
Brammer and Pavelin 2006; Mahoney and Roberts 2007;
Barnea and Rubin 2010; Harjoto and Jo 2011). We expect
this variable to be positively related to SP based on theo-
retical arguments (e.g., Heinkel et al. 2001; Mackey et al.
2007). In all our regressions, standard errors are adjusted
for both heteroskedasticity and clustering of observations.
Empirical Results
Univariate Analysis29
Table 2 presents the sample distribution for all firms (ex-
cept financial and utility firms) covered by KLD between
1991 and 2012. In order to facilitate the interpretation of
our results, we need to characterize our sample clearly. To
do this, we begin by dividing the sample into four groups
based on Strengths (Str) and Concerns (Con) measures as
defined in Table 1. The ‘‘toptier’’ and ‘‘lowtier’’ group
includes all firms having only Strengths and only Concerns,
respectively. The ‘‘medtier’’ group includes all firms hav-
ing both Strengths and Concerns. The ‘‘zerotier’’ group
includes all firms having neither Strengths nor Concerns.
Table 2 shows that 11 % of our sample firms have only
Strengths, 35 % have only Concerns, 44 % have both
Strengths and Concerns, and 10 % have neither Strengths
nor Concerns. The ‘‘toptier’’ group has decreased during
and after the financial crisis (13 % before the crisis and
8 % after the crisis), whereas the ‘‘lowtier’’ group has
increased (from 30 % pre-crisis to 49 % post-crisis). The
‘‘medtier’’ group increased from 46 % pre-crisis to 50 %
during the crisis, and decreased to 32 % post-crisis. The
‘‘zerotier’’ group decreased during the crisis, but returned
to its pre-crisis level after the crisis. The ‘‘medtier’’ group
is the dominant group before and during the crisis
(46–50 %), whereas the ‘‘lowtier’’ group is the dominant
group after the crisis (49 %).
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the social
performance measures (panel A), the risk measures (Panel
B), and the explanatory variables (Panel C) for all firms
(except financial and utility firms) covered by KLD
between 1991 and 2012. Panel A of Table 3 shows that the
mean (median) values of the aggregate measures of social
performance SP which combine strengths and concerns are
negative (-0.03) suggesting that concerns are, on average,
higher than strengths. This observation is confirmed when
the combined measure is split into two aggregate measures
of strengths and concerns. The mean (median) values of
concerns are 0.07 (0.05), whereas the mean (median) val-
ues of strengths are 0.04 (0.02).
Based on Panel B of Table 3, the mean (median) total
risk is 0.45 (0.40) using one-year daily returns. The mean
(median) idiosyncratic risk is 0.39 (0.34) using the CAPM
and quite similar at 0.38 (0.33) using the four-factor model.
The mean (median) systematic risk (market beta) is 1.20
(1.15) using the CAPM and lower at 1.09 (1.06) using the
four-factor model.30 Panel C of Table 3 reports descriptive
statistics for our explanatory variables.
Table 4 reports the means and t-test results (p values)
for the difference in means for risk and social performance
measures across two periods: pre-crisis (1991–2007) and
post-crisis (2010–2012). Our objective is to investigate
whether the post-crisis risks and social performances are
higher or lower than their levels in the pre-crisis period.
For the whole sample, the mean total risk of 44 % for the
post-crisis period is significantly higher than its level of
40 % in the pre-crisis period. The systematic risk (market
beta) has slightly decreased after the crisis to 1.07 relative
Footnote 27 continued
(2003), Mattingly and Berman (2006), Barnea and Rubin (2010),
Mahoney and Roberts (2007), Sharfman and Fernando (2008), and
Harjoto and Jo (2011).
28 Harjoto and Jo (2011) show that analyst coverage is significantly
related to SP. We do not include analyst coverage because it is highly
correlated with firm size.
29 Except for the social performance measures and dummy variables,
the variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to ensure
that our results are not driven by outliers.
30 The mean (median) lower partial moment of order zero (LPM0) is
0.48 when the target return is zero. The distribution of LPM0 is
reasonably symmetric (skewness is -0.25 and kurtosis is 3.11)
indicating a 48 % probability of loss. This reinforces our observation
noted earlier that the return distributions are reasonably symmetric so
that all the correlations between total risk and LPM1 through LPM3
are very high. Our untabulated results for LPM1 through LPM3 are
similar to those reported for total and idiosyncratic risks and are
available from the authors upon request.
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to its pre-crisis level of 1.09. However, the idiosyncratic
risk reverted back to its pre-crisis level in the post-crisis
period of 35 %. Although both the mean strengths and
concerns have increased significantly after the crisis, the
aggregate SP improved slightly (-0.02 in the post-crisis
period relative to -0.03 in the pre-crisis period).
The total risk and the idiosyncratic risk of the ‘‘toptier’’
group have decreased, whereas this group’s systematic risk
has increased in the post-crisis period. In contrast, both
total and idiosyncratic risks have increased and the sys-
tematic risk has decreased in the post-crisis period for the
‘‘lowtier’’ group. After the crisis, the SP of the ‘‘toptier’’
group increased significantly and that of the ‘‘lowtier’’
group decreased significantly. The total and systematic
risks of the ‘‘medtier’’ group reverted back to their pre-
crisis levels in the post-crisis period. However, the
idiosyncratic risk of the ‘‘medtier’’ group has decreased
significantly from its pre-crisis level. The SP of the
‘‘medtier’’ group has improved significantly in the post-
crisis period, although both the mean strengths and con-
cerns have increased significantly after the crisis. The
improved SP for the ‘‘medtier’’ group stems from the fact
that the increase in its strengths is higher than the increase
in its concerns. In summary, Table 4 indicates that risk and
social performance have changed during and after the
financial crisis. Total risk is higher post-crisis compared to
its pre-crisis level. Both the mean strengths and concerns
increased significantly after the crisis, although the overall
SP has slightly improved relative to its pre-crisis level.
In untabulated results, we find that the aggregate mea-
sure of social performance (SP), which combines strengths
and concerns, has a positive correlation of 0.68 with the
strengths (Str) and a negative correlation of -0.54 with
concerns (Con). The correlations between strengths and
concerns is positive but relatively low (0.24), which sup-
ports the notion that they are different concepts and should
be treated separately in empirical work. We also find (re-
sults not reported here) that all risk measures are negatively
correlated with all SP measures (SP, Str and Con). How-
ever, the magnitude of the negative correlation between
risk and Str is higher than that between risk and Con.
Table 5 reports the correlation coefficients among the
independent variables. Only a few of the explanatory
variables are highly correlated as expected. For example,
the correlation coefficient between investment and R&D is
0.68. Except for these special cases, the correlation coef-
ficients are relatively low overall, which mitigate any
multicollinearity concerns that could affect the regression
results.
Multivariate Analysis
Panel A of Table 6 reports the results of the regressions
when using the aggregate social performance (SP) measure
based on three methods: two-way cluster, fixed effects, and
instrumental variable (IV) technique.
Panel A of Table 6 shows that the coefficient associated
with SP, which captures the impact of SP on risk in the pre-
crisis period, is insignificant regardless of the methodology
used. Thus, SP seems to have no effect on risk in the pre-
crisis period. However, the variable SP_crisis is signifi-
cantly and negatively related to the dependent variable,
stock return volatility, in two of the three methodologies
(two-way cluster and fixed effects). The p value of the sum
ða1 þ a2Þ is lower than 5 % in both cases, which implies
that ða1 þ a2Þ is significantly different from zero. The p
Table 2 Sample distribution by year and social performance scores
Year Toptier Lowtier Medtier Zerotier Total
1991 153 100 141 105 499
1992 145 118 179 60 502
1993 107 124 232 35 498
1994 79 109 280 21 489
1995 87 102 284 22 495
1996 107 83 266 43 499
1997 76 98 300 25 499
1998 87 93 294 26 500
1999 91 90 305 18 504
2000 80 80 327 21 508
2001 129 142 378 170 819
2002 104 170 392 126 792
2003 306 613 681 517 2117
2004 258 794 936 236 2224
2005 222 831 920 178 2151
2006 152 795 1080 114 2141
2007 158 798 1056 126 2138
2008 172 793 1082 114 2161
2009 174 773 1084 164 2195
2010 108 1267 701 138 2214
2011 39 1351 718 3 2111
2012 353 500 593 608 2054
Total 3187 9824 12,229 2870 28,110
1991–2012 0.11 0.35 0.44 0.10 1
1991–2007 0.13 0.30 0.46 0.11 1
2008–2009 0.08 0.36 0.50 0.06 1
2010–2012 0.08 0.49 0.32 0.12 1
This table presents the sample distribution for all firms (except
financial and utility firms) covered by KLD between 1991 and 2012.
The sample is divided into four groups based on Strengths (Str) and
Concerns (Con) measures as defined in Table 1. The toptier group
includes all firms having positive Str, but zero Con. The lowtier group
includes all firms having positive Con, but zero Str. The medtier
group includes all firms having both positive Str and positive Con.
The zerotier group includes all firms having zero Str and zero Con
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value of the sum ða1 þ a2Þ is also lower than 5 % under the
IV method, although the coefficients are not significant
individually. Thus, the evidence suggests that SP reduces
stock return volatility significantly during the financial
crisis. In terms of economic significance, an increase in SP
by one standard deviation during the financial crisis
decreases the firm’s volatility by about 1.18–1.84 %.31
The variable SP_crisis is also significantly and nega-
tively related to the dependent variable, idiosyncratic risk,
in one of the three methodologies (fixed effects). The
p value of the sum ða1 þ a2Þ is lower than 5 %, which
implies that ða1 þ a2Þ is significantly different from zero.
In terms of economic significance, an increase in SP by one
standard deviation decreases the firm’s idiosyncratic risk
by about 1.14 % during the financial crisis. This evidence
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the KLD scores, the risk measures, and the explanatory variables for the period 1991–2012
Mean Median Standard deviation Min Max Skewness Kurtosis N
Panel A: SP measures
SP -0.03 -0.03 0.09 -0.464 0.749 1.341 10.354 28,110
Str 0.04 0.02 0.08 0 0.843 3.836 23.756 28,110
Con 0.07 0.05 0.07 0 0.681 1.828 8.974 28,110
Panel B: risk measures
voldw 0.459 0.408 0.225 0.142 1.528 1.654 6.863 27,450
IVcapmdw 0.395 0.349 0.201 0.118 1.436 1.846 8.108 27,450
IV4ffdw 0.381 0.336 0.195 0.113 1.403 1.887 8.354 27,450
betadcapmw 1.205 1.151 0.507 0.131 2.679 0.528 3.151 27,450
betad4ffw 1.090 1.064 0.407 0.030 2.265 0.337 3.361 27,450
Panel C: independent variables
lnmkteq 7.226 7.079 1.611 -3.090 13.348 0.430 3.220 27,945
bmw 0.494 0.407 0.421 0 4.652 3.477 26.500 27,944
Leveragew 0.453 0.156 1.274 0 20.235 9.589 124.806 27,875
netlevw 0.289 0.059 1.155 -1.669 17.474 8.796 109.749 27,996
ret1yw 0.146 0.152 0.443 -1.295 1.576 -0.051 4.650 27,134
rmedinfw 0.095 0.090 0.045 0.009 0.312 1.662 8.460 25,254
avgturdw 2.464 1.897 2.006 0.189 10.754 1.820 6.863 27,450
cvturdw 0.053 0.045 0.026 0.022 0.189 2.156 9.262 27,450
dispeps1w 0.092 0.040 0.145 0 0.990 3.820 20.289 24,966
rd 0.046 0.004 0.117 0 7.791 17.785 860.451 27,996
ad 0.015 0 0.043 0 0.963 6.417 66.826 27,996
capex 0.059 0.039 0.087 -0.519 9.235 44.197 4496.643 27,959
investmentw 0.119 0.088 0.117 -0.006 1.265 3.231 20.464 27,996
expgrthw 0.168 0.140 0.151 0 1 3.517 18.560 25,863
zscorew 4.702 3.408 6.571 -107.123 60.896 2.251 35.499 28,011
displtg 0.046 0.032 0.056 0 1.642 8.505 151.963 18,055
sdroa5yw 0.061 0.033 0.083 0.004 0.537 3.442 17.048 28,058
inv_basew 0.137 0.041 0.251 0.000 2.458 4.355 30.348 27,535
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the social performance measures (panel A), the risk measures (Panel B), and the explanatory or
control variables (Panel C) for all firms (except financial and utility firms) covered by KLD between 1991 and 2012. Except for the social
performance measures and dummy variables, the variables are winsorized (w) at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The variables are as defined in
Table 1
31 To determine the economic significance, we multiply the standard
deviation of the SP score in the crisis period by the sum of the
coefficients associated with SP and SP_crisis [i.e., 0.06 9 (-0.004–
0.138) = -0.00852 or 0.06 9 (-0.02-0.201) = -0.01326]. Thus,
an increase in SP by one standard deviation in the crisis period
decreases the firm’s volatility by 0.852–1.326 % or about
1.84–1.18 % of that period’s average volatility [i.e., -0.00852/
0.718 = -0.0118 or -0.01326/0.718 = 0.0184]. Disregarding the
Footnote 31 continued
lack of statistical significance of the two corresponding coefficients
for the pre-crisis period, the economic impact of a one standard
deviation change in SP for the pre-crisis period is to decrease the
firm’s volatility by 0.028–0.14 % [i.e., 0.07 9 -0.004 = -0.00028
or 0.07 9 -0.02 = -0.0014].
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suggesting that SP reduces idiosyncratic risk during the
financial crisis is rather weak since it holds only in one of
the three methodologies. The coefficient associated with
SP_postcrisis is positive and significant when idiosyncratic
risk is the dependent variable in one of the three method-
ologies (fixed effects). This increase in idiosyncratic risk
after the financial crisis (measured by the sum ða1 þ a3Þ) is
1.24 %, which is statistically significant (p value of the
sum ða1 þ a3Þ \ 5 %). The coefficients associated with
SP_crisis and SP_postcrisis are insignificant when sys-
tematic risk is the dependent variable.
Panel B of Table 6 shows that the coefficients of the
aggregate measures of strengths (Str) and concerns (Con)
are positive and statistically significant when the dependent
variable is either total or idiosyncratic risk. However, those
effects are not consistent across the different methodolo-
gies (hold only in one out of three methodologies), except
for the coefficient of the aggregate measure of strengths
(Str) which is significant in two of the three methodologies
(two-way cluster and IV) when the dependent variable is
idiosyncratic risk. In terms of economic significance, an
increase in the aggregate measure of strengths (Str) by one
standard deviation before the financial crisis increases the
firm’s idiosyncratic risk by about 1.65–5.55 %. Besides,
the coefficient of the aggregate measure of strengths (Str) is
negative and statistically significant when the dependent
variable is systematic risk in only one of the three
methodologies (IV). Moreover, the effect on systematic
risk becomes insignificant when beta is measured using the
CAPM model.32
As shown in Panel B of Table 6, the variable Str_crisis
is significantly and negatively related to the dependent
variable, stock return volatility, regardless of the method-
ology used. Thus, the evidence suggests that the sensitivity
of volatility to changes in the aggregate measure of
strengths (Str) becomes significantly negative during the
financial crisis. In terms of economic significance, an
increase in the aggregate measure of strengths (Str) by one
standard deviation decreases the firm’s volatility by about
0.83–2.57 % during the financial crisis. This effect is based
on the sum ða11 þ a12Þ and its associated p values.
The variable Str_crisis is also significantly and nega-
tively related to the dependent variable, idiosyncratic risk,
regardless of the methodology used. The evidence suggests
that the aggregate measure of strengths (Str) reduces
idiosyncratic risk significantly during the financial crisis. In
terms of economic significance, an increase in the aggre-
gate measure of strengths (Str) by one standard deviation
Table 4 Risk and Social Performance before and after the financial
crisis
Toptier Lowtier Medtier Zerotier All
voldw
Pre-crisis 0.40 0.41 0.38 0.43 0.40
Post-crisis 0.38 0.50 0.38 0.43 0.44
p value
(difference)
0.002 0.000 0.168 0.909 0.000
IV4ffdw
Pre-crisis 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.38 0.35
Post-crisis 0.30 0.39 0.28 0.37 0.35
p value
(difference)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.368 0.501
betad4ffw
Pre-crisis 1.04 1.12 1.08 1.10 1.09
Post-crisis 1.12 1.05 1.08 1.08 1.07
p value
(difference)
0.000 0.000 0.843 0.103 0.001
Toptier Lowtier Medtier Zerotier All
SP
Pre-crisis 0.05 -0.07 -0.02 0 -0.03
Post-crisis 0.16 -0.10 0.06 0 -0.02
p value
(difference)
0.000 0.000 0.000 nd 0.007
Str
Pre-crisis 0.05 0 0.06 0 0.04
Post-crisis 0.16 0 0.17 0 0.07
p value
(difference)
0.000 nd 0.000 nd 0.000
Con
Pre-crisis 0 0.07 0.09 0 0.06
Post-crisis 0 0.10 0.12 0 0.09
p value
(difference)
nd 0.000 0.000 nd 0.000
This table presents the means and t test results (p values) for the dif-
ference in means for risk and social performance measures across two
periods. Years 1991 through 2007 are defined as Pre-crisis period, and
Years 2010 through 2012 are defined as Post-crisis period. The vari-
ables reported are: total risk (voldw), idiosyncratic risk (IV4ffdw),
systematic risk (beta4ffdw), net social performance (SP), Strengths
(Str), and Concerns (Con). All variables are defined in Table 1. The
sample is divided into four groups based on Strengths (Str) and Con-
cerns (Con) measures. The toptier group includes all firms having
positive Str, but zero Con. The lowtier group includes all firms having
positive Con, but zero Str. The medtier group includes all firms having
both positive Str and positive Con. The zerotier group includes all firms
having zero Str and zero Con. The acronym ‘‘nd’’ means ‘‘not defined’’
32 Untabulated results show that the results for systematic risk are
sensitive and depend on how beta is measured. For example, when
using the IV regressions, the coefficient associated with SP becomes
negative and significant when beta is measured using weekly returns.
Also, the coefficient associated with Concerns (Con) becomes
insignificant when beta is measured using weekly returns, and
significantly positive when using downside beta instead of beta
coupled with 3SLS as an estimation method.
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decreases the firm’s idiosyncratic risk by about 0.58–
2.43 % during the financial crisis. This effect is based on
the sum ða11 þ a12Þ and its associated p values.
The coefficient associated with Str_crisis is insignificant
when systematic risk is the dependent variable in two out
of three methods suggesting that the aggregate measure of
strengths (Str) did not change the relation between Str and
systematic risk during the financial crisis.33 However, the
variable Str_postcrisis is significantly and positively
Table 5 Correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
lnmkteq (1) 1
bmw (2) -0.3270* 1
Leveragew (3) -0.1652* 0.2878* 1
netlevw (4) -0.1156* 0.2385* 0.9811* 1
ret1yw (5) 0.0989* -0.2481* -0.1675* -0.1414* 1
rmedinfw (6) -0.1552* 0.1997* 0.1830* 0.1780* -0.1941* 1
avgturdw (7) 0.0098 0.0061 0.0668* 0.0344* -0.0311* 0.0846* 1
cvturdw (8) -0.4842* 0.0494* 0.0419* 0.016 0.0106 0.0251 -0.0428* 1
dispeps1w (9) 0.0027 0.1422* 0.2399* 0.2174* -0.0940* 0.2018* 0.1566* 0.0071 1
rd (10) -0.1589* -0.1453* -0.0943* -0.1292* -0.0369* -0.1509* 0.0763* 0.1969* 0.0312*
ad (11) 0.0011 -0.0599* -0.0258* -0.0232 -0.0077 -0.0134 0.0289* 0.0183 -0.0629*
capex (12) 0.0334* -0.0104 0.0176 0.0383* -0.0223 0.0451* 0.0360* -0.0355* 0.1201*
investmentw (13) -0.1219* -0.1642* -0.0872* -0.1066* -0.0630* -0.1159* 0.1167* 0.1474* 0.0713*
expgrthw (14) -0.1373* -0.0534* -0.0782* -0.0788* 0.0645* 0.4761* 0.0756* 0.0974* -0.0636*
zscorew (15) 0.0751* -0.1825* -0.1801* -0.1709* 0.1009* -0.0788* 0.0728* -0.0193 -0.1247*
displtg (16) -0.0752* 0.0412* 0.0124 -0.0099 0.0152 0.0942* 0.2116* 0.0187 0.0671*
sdroa5yw (17) -0.2828* -0.1043* -0.0646* -0.1039* -0.0202 -0.0244 0.2176* 0.2489* 0.1114*
inv_basew (18) 0.0807* -0.0079 0.0058 0.0191 0.0072 -0.0398* -0.0874* -0.0385* 0.0442*
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
lnmkteq (1)
bmw (2)
Leveragew (3)
netlevw (4)
ret1yw (5)
rmedinfw (6)
avgturdw (7)
cvturdw (8)
dispeps1w (9)
rd (10) 1
ad (11) -0.0638* 1
capex (12) -0.0894* 0.0021 1
investmentw (13) 0.6811* 0.3063* 0.3870* 1
expgrthw (14) 0.0003 -0.008 0.0473* 0.0317* 1
zscorew (15) -0.0992* 0.0530* -0.0801* -0.0439* 0.1329* 1
displtg (16) 0.1132* -0.0520* 0.0637* 0.0912* 0.3545* 0.015 1
sdroa5yw (17) 0.4413* 0.0233 0.0329* 0.4313* 0.1105* 0.0526* 0.2084* 1
inv_basew (18) -0.0616* 0.0379* 0.0319* -0.0219 -0.0704* 0.0105 -0.0713* -0.0898* 1
This table presents the correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables for all firms (except financial and utility firms) covered by KLD
between 1991 and 2012. All variables are defined in Table 1. * Statistical significance at the 1 % level (p\ 0.01)
33 The coefficient associated with Str_crisis is negative and signif-
icant only when the fixed effects method is used. In this case, the sum
of the coefficients ða11 þ a12Þ is negative and statistically significant
suggesting a decrease of market beta of about 1.2 % during the
financial crisis. However, this coefficient becomes insignificant when
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related to the dependent variable, systematic risk, in one of
the three methodologies (IV). The coefficient associated
with Str_postcrisis is negative and significant when total
risk is the dependent variable in one of the three method-
ologies (two-way cluster). In terms of economic signifi-
cance, a one standard deviation change in Str during the
post-crisis period decreases systematic risk by about
1.57 %, but increases total risk by about 0.39 %. Those
effects are not significant as the p values of the sum of the
coefficients for Str and Str_postcrisis ða11 þ a13Þ are higher
than 10 %.
The variable Str_postcrisis is significantly and nega-
tively related to the dependent variable, idiosyncratic risk,
in two of the three methodologies (two-way cluster and
IV). The p value of the sum ða11 þ a13Þ is lower than 5 %
when using the IV method, but higher than 10 % when
using the two-way cluster method. Thus, there is weak
evidence suggesting that the aggregate measure of
strengths (Str) reduces idiosyncratic risk significantly after
the financial crisis.
Panel B of Table 6 also reports the results of the
potential impact of the aggregate measure of concerns
(Con) on a firm’s risk during and after the financial crisis.
The results show much less statistical significance sug-
gesting a lower or no impact at all. There is some evidence
suggesting that the sensitivities of volatility and idiosyn-
cratic risk (when using the two-way cluster method) to the
aggregate measure of concerns (Con) have decreased after
the financial crisis. In terms of economic significance, a
one standard deviation change in Con after the crisis period
based on the sum ða21 þ a23Þ using the two-way cluster
method translates into an increase of 0.98 % in volatility
and 1.14 % in idiosyncratic risk. With one exception (when
using the two-way cluster method and the dependent
variable is idiosyncratic risk), none of the coefficients
associated with Con_crisis is significant suggesting that the
aggregate measure of concerns (Con) has no impact on a
firm’s risk during the crisis period.
In summary, the results reported in Table 6 have three
implications. First, the relation between SP and risk varies
over time (is dynamic) and depends on market conditions.
Our results indicate that the relation between SP and risk is
significantly different in the crisis period compared to the
pre-crisis period. Second, social performance reduces
volatility and idiosyncratic risk significantly during the
financial crisis, primarily due to the strengths component of
SP. However, the impact of SP on systematic risk during
the financial crisis is less obvious. Third, the relation
between the strengths and risk is stronger than the relation
between the concerns and risk during the financial crisis,
which suggests an asymmetric relation between the SP
components and a firm’s risk. During the financial crisis,
the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients
associated with the aggregate measure of strengths (Str) are
higher than those of the coefficients associated with the
aggregate concerns measure (Con). This is a new finding as
previous CSR findings reported in the literature that the
asymmetric financial effect is due to concerns, not
strengths (e.g., Kappou and Oikonomou 2014, in a different
context).34 In particular, we show that strengths are very
useful in terms of risk reduction during tough periods (e.g.,
financial crises or economic recessions). This implies that
firms belonging to the ‘‘lowtier’’ or ‘‘zerotier’’ group could
benefit by migrating to the other two groups (i.e., ‘‘med-
tier’’ or ‘‘toptier’’ group) if their financial fragility is
adversely affected by bad economic conditions.
Robustness Checks
Reverse Causality: Simultaneous
Equation Framework
Endogeneity bias is a crucial challenge in the CSR
empirical literature since it prevents researchers from
drawing causal inferences (Jiraporn et al. 2014). In the
previous section, we controlled for the endogeneity of SP
using the instrumental variable (IV) approach. However,
another potential source of endogeneity is simultaneity bias
if SP and the firm’s risk are jointly determined. The risk
mitigation view (i.e., the stakeholder theory perspective)
predicts that firms with higher SP could have higher
financial performance (e.g., due to lower risk). However,
there exist theoretical justifications for the proposition that
financial performance causes SP (e.g., slack resources
hypothesis).35 Waddock and Graves (1997) find that SP is
both a predictor and consequence of financial performance.
That is, there is a simultaneous relationship, or a kind of
‘virtuous circle’, which they explain by a simultaneous and
interactive impact between theoretical arguments such as
the slack resources theory and the stakeholder theory. In
our context, this implies that a firm’s risk may in turn affect
its SP in several ways. For example, the largest firms with
Footnote 33 continued
beta is measured using the CAPM model. Similarly, the sum of the
coefficients ða11 þ a12Þ becomes insignificant.
34 For example, Kappou and Oikonomou (2014) find that unethical
transgressions are penalized more heavily than responsibility is
rewarded. They find that the addition of a stock to a social index does
not lead to material changes in its market price, whereas deletions are
accompanied by negative cumulative abnormal returns.
35 The slack resources theory suggests that the availability of slack
resources provides the opportunity for firms to improve their SP
through CSR investments (McGuire et al. 1988; Waddock and Graves
1997).
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rather stable cash flows, and generally lower stock price
volatility, can afford to initiate social actions. All else held
equal, lower cash flow volatility and enduring profitability
are prerequisites for social commitment according to the
slack resources hypothesis. It is also possible that managers
of less risky firms may be less prone to improve their SP
due to lower stakeholders’ pressure. Alternatively, man-
agers of risky firms may improve SP in an attempt to
change the perceptions of investors and analysts about the
risk profile of their firms. Based on a meta-analysis of 18
studies that examine the relationship between SP and firm
risk in any form, Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001) find that
prior SP is negatively related to subsequent firm risk, and
prior firm risk is negatively related to subsequent SP.
To address this particular form of endogeneity, we fol-
low Mishra and Modi (2013) and use a simultaneous
equations system where SP affects the firm’s risk and is, in
turn, affected by the latter. Specifically, we estimate a
simultaneous system of equations using three-stage-least
squares (3SLS):
Strit ¼ b0 þ k1Riskit1 þ p1Strit1 þ u1Conit1 þ hXit1
þ ci þ gt þ xit
ð8aÞ
Conit ¼ t0 þ k2Riskit1 þ p2Strit1 þ u2Conit1 þ dXit1
þ ci þ gt þ lit
ð8bÞ
Riskit ¼ a0 þ a11Strit þ a12Strit  Crisisit þ a13Strit
 PostCrisisit þ a21Conit þ a22Conit  Crisisit
þ a23Conit  PostCrisisit þ wXit þ ci þ gt þ eit
ð8cÞ
where Riskit is the risk measure and Strit (Conit) is the
strengths (concerns) measure for firm i at time t. The three
equations of the system have the same set of control
variables. Riskit, Strit, and Conit are now treated as being
endogenous. Following Mishra and Modi (2013), we
include firms’ fixed effects to control for unobserved time
invariant firm characteristics (ci). Since our sample
includes more than 3000 firms, it is not convenient to
include thousands of dummies in the system of equations.
Instead, we first remove the fixed effects from all variables,
including dependent and independent variables. This is
achieved by demeaning all the variables, i.e., for every
company, we subtract the mean value of the variable across
time from each observation. Then, we estimate the system
of equations using the 3SLS method applied on the
demeaned variables. We also include time dummies in all
equations (gt).
The results of the 3SLS estimation reported in Table 7
are consistent with the results reported in Table 6. The
coefficient associated with the variable Str_crisis is
negative and statistically significant when either volatility
or idiosyncratic risk is the dependent variable. Thus, the
evidence suggests that the sensitivity of volatility and
idiosyncratic risk to changes in the aggregate measure of
strengths (Str) changes significantly and becomes negative
during the financial crisis. In terms of economic signifi-
cance, an increase in the aggregate measure of strengths
(Str) by one standard deviation decreases the firm’s
volatility (idiosyncratic risk) by about 1.74 % (1.88 %)
during the financial crisis based on the sum ða11 þ a12Þ and
its associated p value.
When the systematic risk is the dependent variable, the
coefficient associated with Str_crisis is also negative and
significant. Although statistically significant on its own, the
total effect on systematic risk in the crisis period,
ða11 þ a12Þ, is not statistically significant (p value =
0.456). Moreover, none of the coefficients associated with
Str_postcrisis is significant confirming our results reported
in Table 6 where the aggregate measure of strengths (Str)
has little or no impact on a firm’s risk after the crisis
period.
The results reported in Table 7 also show that the
coefficient associated with Con_postcrisis is negative and
significant when the dependent variable is idiosyncratic
risk as it was the case in Table 6 (using the two-way cluster
method). Although statistically significant on its own, the
total effect on idiosyncratic risk after the crisis period,
ða21 þ a23Þ, is not statistically significant (p value =
0.456). However, Table 7 shows some evidence suggesting
that the sensitivity of total risk to changes in the aggregate
measure of concerns (Con) has increased during the
financial crisis but not thereafter. In terms of economic
significance, a one standard deviation change in Con during
the crisis period translates into an increase of 2.34 % in
volatility based on the sum ða21 þ a22Þ.
Alternative Model Specification36
We run several sensitivity tests to examine whether our
results are robust to alternative model specifications.
36 We also computed two alternatives risk measures referred
to as stock price crash risk (NSKEW and DUVOL) following Chen
et al. (2001) and Kim et al. (2010). For a given year, NSKEW is
the negative conditional skewness of firm-specific weekly returns.
DUVOL is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation
of firm-specific weekly returns in the down weeks (i.e.,
below the weekly mean return over the previous year) to the standard
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns in the up weeks (i.e.,
above the mean return). Firm-specific weekly return is defined
as the natural logarithm of one plus the residual term from the CAPM
model with lead and lag weekly market returns. None of the coeffi-
cients associated with the aggregate measure of SP or the two
aggregate measures of strengths (Str) and concerns (Con) are
significant when the dependent variable is the stock price crash risk
measure. The only exception is obtained when using the IV estimation
K. Bouslah et al.
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Specifically, we re-estimate our basic model after replacing
and/or adding several control variables. First, we replace
expected growth (mean annualized five-year earnings
growth rate from I/B/E/S) by average five-year sales
growth, and book-to-market ratio by Tobin’s Q. Second,
we use Amihud illiquidity measure computed as in Amihud
(2002) as an alternative measure of firm liquidity. Third,
we use the percentage signed (absolute) forecast error as an
alternative measure of earnings variability. Forecast error is
measured as the difference between the one-year ahead
median earnings forecast and the actual earnings deflated
by the stock price at the measurement date of our depen-
dent variables. Fourth, we use two alternative proxies for
default risk instead of the Zscore: bond rating and invest-
ment grade rating. Bond Rating is a dummy variable equal
to one if the long-term debt of the firm is rated and equal to
zero otherwise. Firms without ratings are expected to be
more risky than those having ratings. Conditional on hav-
ing a rating, a firm is categorized as investment grade if it
has a rating higher than BB? and as junk if it has a rating
of BB? or less. Investment grade rating is a dummy
variable equal to one if S&P debt rating is higher than
BB? and equal to zero otherwise. Investment grade debt is
expected to be less risky than non-investment grade debt.
Finally, we include free cash flow to equity (or to the firm)
as an additional control variable.37 Overall, our untabulated
results are robust to all these alternative model
specifications.38
Additional Robustness Checks39
At first glance, some of our findings seems at odds with
those reported in some previous studies (e.g., Mishra and
Modi 2013; Oikonomou et al. 2012). For example, some of
our results show that both strengths and concerns are
positively related to risk before the financial crisis (when
using two-way cluster). This seems at odds with those
previous studies that found either a negative or insignifi-
cant link between strengths and some risk measures.40 For
example, Mishra and Modi (2013) find that the coefficient
for strengths (PCSR) is negative and the one for concerns
(NCSR) is positive, and both are highly significant. Simi-
larly, Oikonomou et al. (2012) find that the coefficient for
strengths is negatively but weakly related to systematic risk
and that the coefficient for concerns is positively and
strongly related to systematic risk.
Several factors could explain why our results are some-
how different from those previous studies such as differ-
ences in sample selection criteria, differences in the
empirical design, e.g., different model specifications and
estimation techniques, and differences in the time period
examined. We now empirically examine each of these three
possible explanations. We begin by constructing sub-sam-
ples in addition to our original sample which is an unbal-
anced panel covering the period 1991–2012: a balanced
panel covering the period 1991–2012, and a balanced panel
covering the period 2000–2009 following Mishra and Modi
(2013). We repeat all our empirical analysis for these sub-
samples. We discuss below the empirical findings.
Restricting our sample to only those firms with non-
missing data in the KLD database over the time period
1991–2012 results in a balanced panel of only 204 firms
with a total of 4229 firm-year observations. This balanced
sample represents less than 10 % of the full sample (around
3000 firms with a total of 28,110 firm-year observations).
Clearly, this sample suffers from severe survivorship and
selection biases. Some of the results for this balanced panel
are similar to those reported for the full sample, whereas
other results are different. For example, the coefficient
associated with the variable Str_crisis is negative and sta-
tistically significant when either volatility or idiosyncratic
risk is the dependent variable. The coefficient associated
with the variable Str_postcrisis is also negative and sta-
tistically significant. However, the coefficients associated
with the variables Con_crisis and Con_postcrisis are
insignificant for this balanced panel. Overall, the results for
this balanced panel suggest that the relation between the
strengths and risk is stronger than the relation between the
concerns and risk during and after the financial crisis,
which confirm our conjecture regarding the asymmetric
relation between the SP components and a firm’s risk.
We now follow Mishra and Modi (2013) by only
including firms with non-missing data in the KLD, CRSP,
and COMPUSTAT databases over the time period
2000–2009. These sampling criteria result in a balanced
panel of only 207 firms with a total of 1742 firm-year
Footnote 36 continued
method where the coefficients associated with SP and Str (Con) are
negative (positive) and significant. These untabulated results are
available from the authors upon request.
37 The free cash flow to equity is computed as net income plus
depreciation minus capital expenditures minus changes in non-cash
working capital minus net debt issues minus preferred dividends. The
free cash flow to the firm is computed as EBIT minus taxes paid plus
depreciation minus capital expenditures minus changes in non-cash
working capital.
38 The untabulated results are available from the authors upon
request. The inclusion of some of these variables (e.g., bond rating or
investment grade rating) significantly reduces the number of obser-
vations (not all firms are rated) and the goodness of fit of the model.
The model used in this paper provides the highest R-square (i.e.,
tradeoff between model parsimony and the inclusion of additional
explanatory variables).
39 The untabulated results of these additional tests are available
from the authors upon request.
40 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this important
issue.
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observations (Mishra and Modi use a balanced panel of 192
firms with a total of 1728 firm-year observations). As with
the previous balanced panel, this sample suffers from
severe survivorship and selection biases, e.g., it represents
less than 10 % of the full sample covered by KLD. Using
their modeling approach (3SLS) as well as the same vari-
ables used in their study, we are able to replicate their
results. That is, we find that the coefficient associated with
strengths (PCSR) is negative and the one associated with
concerns (NCSR) is positive, and both are highly signifi-
cant. We also examine the same sample using their mod-
eling approach (3SLS), but using our variables (those used
in our paper). We find similar results. We also examine the
same sample and variables as Mishra and Modi (2013), but
with different methodologies (two-way cluster regression
model of Petersen (2009), the two-way fixed effects model,
and the Instrumental variables (IV) regression). Their
results hold only in one particular case: the dependent
variable is volatility and the estimation method is the fixed
effects model. Overall, their results differ depending on the
modeling approach used. Clearly, the results of Mishra and
Modi (2013) are specific to their sample and the method-
ology used.
In addition, we examine the impact of using alternative
measures of social performance on our results. To do this,
we recompute the strengths and concerns measures follow-
ing Oikonomou et al. (2012). The calculation is similar to
the one used in our paper, except that they consider only five
dimensions instead of seven. They exclude corporate gov-
ernance and human rights. The SP measures of Oikonomou
et al. (2012) are very highly correlated with our SP measures
(0.9 or more) suggesting that the results using any of these
measures will not be materially different. We re-estimate
our regressions using the SP measures of Oikonomou et al.
(2012) and find similar results. The only difference is that
the coefficients associated with the variables SP_crisis,
Str_crisis, and Str_postcrisis are positive and significant
when the dependent variable is beta using the IV method.
Another issue could be the length of the pre-crisis period
which is relatively long since it includes 17 years, whereas
the post-crisis period includes only 3 years at the end of the
sample. Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) have shown that the
link between SP and financial performance has strength-
ened with time. This raises the issue that our findings could
be an artifact of that generic trend rather than a response to
the crisis itself. We empirically explore this issue by
splitting the time-series dimension of the sample in dif-
ferent ways. In particular, we shorten the pre-crisis period
by using additional interaction variables in the regressions
to see if our results are robust. Specifically, we split the
sample into four subperiods: prebubble: 1991–1998 (‘‘the
1990s’’), bubble: 1999–2000 (‘‘the internet bubble’’), pre-
crisis: 2001–2007 (‘‘the 2000s’’), crisis: 2008–2009 (‘‘the
financial crisis’’), and post-crisis: 2010–2012 (‘‘the post-
crisis period’’). In this way, the coefficient associated with
the variable SP (Str or Con) captures the prebubble period
(1991–1998). The focus is on the coefficients of the
interaction variables associated with the pre-crisis, crisis,
and post-crisis. The untabulated results show that the
variable Str_crisis continues to be significantly and nega-
tively related to the stock return volatility and idiosyncratic
risk in most cases. However, the coefficients associated
with the variable Str_precrisis and Con_precrisis are
mostly insignificant. Overall, our main findings remain
unchanged.
Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of the recent financial
crisis (2008–2009) on the relation between a firm’s risk and
social performance (SP) using a sample of non-financial
U.S. firms covering the period 1991–2012. The main
results can be summarized as follows. First, the relation
between SP and risk is time-varying and depends on
market conditions. Our results indicate that the relation
between SP and risk is significantly different in the crisis
period (post-crisis period) compared to the pre-crisis
period.
Second, the aggregated social performance or SP
(strengths minus concerns) reduces volatility significantly
during the financial crisis. An increase in SP of one stan-
dard deviation decreases the firm’s volatility by about
1.18–1.84 % during the financial crisis depending upon the
estimation method. The risk reduction potential of SP is
mainly due to the strengths component of SP. An increase
in the aggregate measure of strengths (Str) by one standard
deviation decreases the firm’s volatility (idiosyncratic risk)
by about 0.83–2.57 % (0.58–2.43 %) during the financial
crisis.
Third, the relation between the strengths and risk is
stronger than the relation between the concerns and risk
during the financial crisis, which suggests an asymmetric
relation between the social performance components and a
firm’s risk. It follows that strengths are more useful in
terms of risk reduction during adverse economic environ-
ments (e.g., financial crises, economic recessions).
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Appendix
The expected return is proxied by the cost of equity capital
calculated using the implied cost of capital methodology
(ICC approach hereafter). The main idea of the ICC
approach is to treat each firm as an investment project and to
use the valuation equation in order to back out the cost of
equity. The cost of equity is the discount rate (or the internal
rate of return) that equates the current stock price to the
present value of all expected future cash flows. Investors’
expectations are proxied by financial analyst forecasts,
assuming that analysts’ forecasts reflect or drive investors’
beliefs. Several studies have used the ICC approach along
with forecasted earnings to estimate the cost of equity at the
firm-level (e.g., Claus and Thomas 2001; Gebhardt et al.
2001; Easton 2004; Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 2005; Hail
and Leuz 2006; Witmer and Zorn 2007; Lee et al. 2009).
The ICC approach using forecasted earnings is appealing
because it provides an ex ante cost of equity measure. Most
asset pricing theories are formulated in terms of ex ante
predictions. By inferring the cost of equity from current
price and expectations about the future, we can think of the
cost of equity as a market-determined measure (Ohlson and
Juettner-Nauroth 2005). We follow this research stream by
computing the cost of equity for each firm-year observation
using five ICC models: PEG ratio model of Easton (2004),
MPEG ratio model of Easton (2004), ICC model of Ohlson
and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), ICC model of Claus and
Thomas (2001), and ICC model of Lee et al. (2009). For
each firm-year observation we compute the implied cost of
equity using current stock price, book value per share, one-
year-ahead and two-year-ahead mean earnings per share
forecasts, payout ratio, five-year annualized mean (median)
growth rate (an estimate for short-term growth obtained
from I/B/E/S), and an estimate for the long-term growth rate
(e.g., expected inflation rate). The implementation of the
five ICC models is similar to that of Hail and Leuz (2006)
and El Ghoul et al. (2011). We use the average implied cost
of equity (rmedinfw) based on the five models as our proxy
for the cost of equity. Details on the implementation of the
five models are available from the authors upon request.
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